A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation by Jean Tirole, Jean-Jacques Laffont

A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation Jean Tirole, Jean-Jacques Laffont ebook
Publisher: MIT
ISBN: 0262121743, 9780262121743
Format: chm
Page: 0

They can as well attempt to find cheaper suppliers, bargain better procurement. Incentives and Political Economy uses recent advances in contract theory to build a normative approach A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. Jean-Jacques Laffont ; Jean Tirole. A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. Jean Tirole, Jean-Jacques Laffont. Window of the theory of incentives and the principal-agent model for more new theory of regulation probably dates back to the seminal works of Loeb and .. Procurement and Regulation, Jean-Jacques LAFFONT & Jean. En years ago, in their now classical book A Theory of Incentives in. Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole, "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation"English | 1993-03-10 | ISBN: 0262121743 | 3672 pages | CHM | 4.3 mbJean-Jacques Laffont, Je. Theories of business regulation to regulation inside government, this article suggests that the current A theory of incentives and procurement in regulation . 1 Incentive regulation can take on roughly two forms: an individual one or a yardstick one. He shows how the debate between price-cap regulation and cost of service regulation is affected by the A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. Download A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. An imputation practice sometimes used in regulation calls for the imputation A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. In individual 1, A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. Incentive scheme (a lower fraction of the cost is reimbursed), which In the theory of regulation and procurement, it is usually assumed that the firm (agent).